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Detecting Target-Driven Earnings
Management Based on the Distribution
of Digits
Robert Ullmann∗ and Christoph Watrin
Abstract: We present a novel research design to detect target-driven earnings management
in accounting data. As a particular concern in this line of research, information about the
exact earnings target value of a given firm is often not available. We therefore develop an
empirical strategy that does not require such information. To this end, we rely on the concept
of the distribution of digits rather than the distribution of the earnings metric itself. We
then theoretically derive that the mean of the distribution of digits, in particular, exhibits a
specific pattern around the earnings target that can be exploited to investigate target-driven
earnings management. This pattern arises regardless of the distribution of digits that obtains
in unmanaged data. We extensively test our theoretical predictions using both simulated and
archival data.
Keywords: distribution of digits, target-driven earnings management, Benford’s Law
1. INTRODUCTION
The measurement of cross-sectional differences in earnings management continues
to be one of the most relevant issues in accounting research (Jorgensen et al.,
2014). Within this subject area, one important line of research focuses on earnings
management activity intended to meet (or exceed) a given earnings target. Target-
beating is a specific dimension of earnings quality and, consequently, requires its
own proxies (Dechow et al., 2010). Previous research in this area largely focuses on
three distinct earnings targets, namely (i) zero earnings, (ii) previous-period earnings,
and (iii) analysts’ forecasts (Dechow et al., 2010). However, numerous alternative (yet
unobservable) earnings targets exist.
We develop a research design that allows the investigation of target-driven earnings
management in accounting data when information concerning relevant earnings
target values is not available. To this end, we rely on a concept that is well established
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in previous research on target-driven earnings management – although not among
the most common measures – namely, the distribution of digits (e.g., Bhattacharya et al.,
2010). The distribution of digits draws inferences not from the total value of a certain
metric but instead from its numerical structure, i.e., the frequency of occurrence and the
exact sequence of the digits ‘0’ to ‘9’ in the mantissa.
As a more technical aspect, previous research has relied on, as a benchmark, a
certain set of theoretically derived distributions of digits that might be expected to
obtain in accounting data in the absence of any earnings management (most notably,
Benford’s Law) – even though empirical evidence on the validity of such an approach
is limited (e.g., Watrin et al., 2008). To the contrary, our empirical strategy does not
rely on any theoretically derived distribution of digits. This advancement is made
possible through the identification of a pattern in the mean of the distribution of
digits in managed earnings that obtains regardless of the underlying distribution
of digits in unmanaged earnings. This then enables reliance on relative comparisons
of the distributions of digits between two or more groups of firms. We recognize that
the advantage of not relying on a theoretically derived distribution of digits trades off
against the requirement that data on at least two groups of firms must be available to
the researcher. We argue that such a data requirement does not limit the applicability
of our research design in practice, as most earnings management studies are already
based on relative comparisons, with group allocations based on, for instance, listing
status (e.g., Dechow et al., 2010), country of residence (e.g., Burgstahler et al., 2006)
or periods of time (e.g., before and after the US 1986 Tax Reform Act, Shackelford
and Shevlin, 2001).
We contribute in three ways. First, testing of target-driven earnings management
is facilitated in settings that are not accessible with current methods. Specifically, our
research design is applicable when information on earnings targets cannot be obtained
and, moreover, even when the above-mentioned theoretically derived distributions of
digits are suspected to be invalid in unmanaged data. It can even be applied when
all groups under investigation manage earnings to a different degree. Second, our
research design has low data requirements and thus low implicit costs of inference
testing. Notably, it is applicable in simple cross-sectional analyses, whereas most other
earnings management measures require panel data. Along the same lines, we require
availability of only the earnings metric directly affected by target-driven earnings
management. Building on these features, researchers can pool more firms into their
samples with our research design than with designs that have more rigorous data
requirements. Finally, we report superior statistical characteristics. To this end, we
first note that the research design can be easily implemented and interpreted –
once developed and well understood – as programming and inferential analysis are
nearly trivial. More importantly, we report that our research design has higher power
in small samples relative to the most closely related method developed in Carslaw
(1988).
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 summarizes the relevant research in
target-driven earnings management. We distinguish between research on observable
earnings targets (i.e., zero earnings, previous-year earnings, analysts’ forecasts) and
research on non-observable earnings targets, where the latter relates to previous
work on the distribution of digits. Section 3 combines these two research streams
to develop our novel empirical strategy from a theoretical perspective. In this
regard, we also elaborate on the general concept of the distribution of digits. In
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Sections 4(i) and 4(ii), we test our research design based on simulated and archival
data. We deliberately rely on a variety of data sources and settings to avoid sample
selection bias. The study’s limitations are discussed in Section 4(iii). We then extend
the fundamental principle of this novel research design to applications in standard
regression analysis in Section 5 and conclude in Section 6.
2. RELATED LITERATURE
(i) Observable Earnings Targets (Distribution of the Earnings Metric)
Previous research in the area of earnings management has identified asymmetries in
the frequency distribution of the earnings metric near specific earnings target thresholds
(essentially following seminal works by Hayn, 1995 and Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997).
The most common thresholds employed are (i) zero (e.g., Burgstahler and Dichev,
1997; Degeorge et al., 1999; Bhattacharya et al., 2003; Burgstahler and Eames, 2006;
Lang et al., 2006; Barua et al., 2010; and Dierynck et al., 2012), (ii) previous-period
value (e.g., Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Degeorge et al., 1999; Beatty et al., 2002;
Barua et al., 2010; and Frankel et al., 2011), and (iii) analysts’ consensus forecasts
(e.g., Degeorge et al., 1999; Brown and Higgins, 2001, 2005; Burgstahler and Eames,
2006; Koh et al., 2008; Barua et al., 2010; and Eames and Kim, 2012).
Three concerns are noteworthy in this line of research. First, the cut-off at
which researchers consider a given value to be near the earnings target is arbitrary
(Badertscher et al., 2012). Second, earnings targets must in fact be publicly observable.
Lahr (2014) has provided a more flexible approach to the latter aspect, although
it still requires information on potential earnings targets (Section 4(ii)(d)). Finally,
technical aspects such as the effect of taxes (Beaver et al., 2007) and the effect of
scaling (Degeorge et al., 1999; Durtschi and Easton, 2005, 2009; and Jorgensen et al.,
2014; with a discussion by Burgstahler, 2014; Donelson et al., 2013; and Burgstahler
and Chuk, 2015) have been criticized in the literature. The research design presented
in this paper is not subject to these concerns.
(ii) Non-Observable Earnings Targets (Distribution of Digits)
Research investigating earnings management with non-observable earnings targets
generally relies on the distribution of digits. The distribution of digits focuses on the
occurrence of each digit from ‘0’ to ‘9’ within a given dataset. It technically does
not allow investigation of the absolute size of a certain value but instead focuses
on its numerical structure and hence on the frequency and the sequence of the
digits.
Carslaw (1988) was the first to apply the distribution of digits to measure earnings
management to meet non-observable earnings targets. For his analyses, he relies on
a pattern called Benford’s Law (Newcomb, 1881; and Benford, 1938). Benford’s Law
implies that the distribution of digits in large, unmanipulated datasets is not uniform,
as one might intuitively expect, but logarithmic. Carslaw (1988) finds significantly
more occurrences of digit ‘0’ and significantly fewer occurrences of digit ‘9’ in his data
than Benford’s Law would suggest, thus indicating upward-rounding behaviour in his
sample of publicly listed New Zealand firms. Carslaw’s findings have been confirmed
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in other world regions and for various types of earnings metrics by Thomas (1989),
Niskanen and Keloharju (2000), van Caneghem (2002, 2004), Kinnunen and Koskela
(2003),1 Skousen et al. (2004), and Guan et al. (2006). Das and Zhang (2003) and
Jorgensen et al. (2014) rely on an approach that is statistically similar to that of
Carslaw (1988) but employ a uniform distribution to investigate target-driven earnings
management behaviour in the distribution of digits for the ratio earnings per share,
where Benford’s Law might not hold.
All of these analyses demand specific assumptions regarding the distribution of
digits that would be theoretically obtained in unmanaged earnings. However, research
has not yet unambiguously identified such a distribution of digits. In particular,
Benford’s Law is not a law of nature but rather a frequently observed regularity
(Watrin et al., 2008; Dlugosz and Müller-Funk, 2009; and Diekmann and Jann, 2010).
Therefore, reliance on Benford’s Law, or any other theoretically derived distribution
of digits, may bias research findings. Consequently, we argue that using inter-group
comparisons of the distribution of digits will often be more appropriate for the analysis
of target-driven earnings management.
3. THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE RESEARCH DESIGN
(i) Mantissa Notation and the Distribution of Digits
Our empirical strategy combines the research streams outlined in Sections 2(i) and
2(ii). Because we rely on the distribution of digits, we investigate the numerical structure,
i.e., the frequency of occurrence and the sequence of digits from ‘0’ to ‘9’, rather than
the total value of the underlying earnings metric. To appropriately isolate the effects
on the distribution of digits, we convert the values of the earnings metric to scientific
mantissa notation:
N = M · 10λ (1)
where N, M  R+, λ  Z, and M  [1, 10).
In non-technical terms, we shift the decimal point to the left in any value of the
earnings metric until only one non-zero digit to the left of the decimal point remains
and account for the magnitude of the earnings metric in λ. In notational terms, M is
the mantissa of the reported value N of the earnings metric in question, with base 10 and
exponent λ. We restrict the analysis to positive values of M because we are interested
in earnings targets, which are likely greater than zero.2 We correspondingly denote
the unmanaged earnings value as N+ = M+ · 10λ+. Note that N = N+ if no earnings
management occurs. The earnings target value is denoted as N* = M* · 10λ*.
Following Newcomb (1881) and Benford (1938), we assume the following:
A1: The distribution of digits is not conditional on λ.
1 Kinnunen and Koskela (2003) also present evidence that firms focus on ‘behavioural’ earnings targets,
i.e., values that derive from relatively small upward rounding but that are conceived to be considerably larger
than the unmanaged value.
2 Note that the subsequently described effect on the distribution of digits would simply be reversed with
negative values.
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An important consequence of A1 is that the magnitude of N, N+, or N* is not
relevant to an analysis of the mantissa. We then make the following assumptions:
A2: N+ cannot be observed (or it is too costly to observe it).
A3: N* cannot be observed (or it is too costly to observe it).
Neither A2 nor A3 is a necessary condition; hence, factual observability of N+ or N*
is obviously not problematic. However, being able to set A2 and A3 as they are set here
decreases data requirements. Naturally, N must always be observable.
As further denotations, we refer to the leftmost digit within the mantissa, i.e., the
position to the left of the decimal point, as the digit in the first position; we refer to the
position directly to the right of the decimal point as the second position, and so forth.
More generally, we denote all positions X as the Xth position. Note that the Xth position
therefore never represents a particular digit but merely the position of a digit within
the mantissa. The actual digit from ‘0’ to ‘9’ in the Xth position is denoted DX, DX*,
or DX+.3 The distribution of digits in the Xth position consequently indicates the (expected
or observed) frequency of occurrence of the digits from ‘0’ to ‘9’ conditional on X.
We note that ‘0’ may not occur in the first position with the specific mantissa notation
selected above.
(ii) Distribution of Digits in the Event of Target-Driven Earnings Management
(a) Target-Driven Earnings Management
We investigate how target-driven earnings management affects the distribution of
digits in a dataset. To derive these effects, we conjecture:
A4: In managed earnings, the distribution of N exhibits a discontinuity such that there is a
relatively small number of observations slightly below N* and a relatively high number of
observations at N = N* or slightly above N*.
Assumption A4 follows straightforwardly from the analysis of Burgstahler and
Dichev (1997), who demonstrate that the distribution of N in managed earnings ex-
hibits more values slightly above or exactly equal to the earnings target N* than slightly
below it. Conversely, with unmanaged earnings, no such pattern should occur because
the earnings target N* then has no effect on the distribution of N (i.e., a symmetric
distribution of N around N* results). Further empirical justification for A4 is provided
by Kinney et al. (2002), who present evidence that large absolute earnings surprises
yield considerably smaller capital market reactions per unit of earnings surprise than
small absolute surprises, indicating decreasing marginal returns of upward earnings
management once the earnings target is met. Conversely, the literature acknowledges
that narrowly missing an earnings target has a disproportionately large impact in
the capital markets (e.g., Bartov et al., 2002; Matsumoto, 2002; Skinner and Sloan,
2002; Jia, 2013; and Lacina et al., 2013). Consequently, the incentive to manage
earnings upward is particularly high when the earnings target is close. Research even
3 Hence, for instance, a value of N = 98.76 has four positions X, which hold the digits DX=1 = 9, DX=2 = 8,
DX=3 = 7 and DX=4 = 6.
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demonstrates that managers manipulate earnings downward in cases in which an
earnings target is exceeded by a large amount (e.g., Peasnell et al., 2005) or when
credit rating thresholds are already met (e.g., Alissa et al., 2013) and thereby preserve
the potential for upward earnings management for future periods.
We must then ask how the distributions of digits in the Xth positions within the
mantissa M of reported earnings N are affected by earnings management. The answer
depends on the mantissa M* of the earnings target N*. We conjecture:
A5: M* is a result of rounding.
In other words, the accuracy of an earnings target N* is lower than the accuracy
of the ‘real’ earnings N+. Earnings targets are rarely given to the units digits but
rather are given to the thousands or millions digits. For instance, if the previous
year’s earnings amount to €129,394 and the next year’s earnings are expected to be
similar, the earnings target is unlikely to be set to €129,394 but instead will be set
to, for example, €130,000; hence, M* = 1.30000 (for a related discussion on target
setting with respect to earnings per share, see Dechow and You, 2012). Regarding
notation, we refer to a position X as a target position if – when considering M* – the
position contains a digit that is not ‘0’ or if the position contains a digit that is ‘0’
but is followed by a position that contains a digit that is not ‘0’. These positions and
the digits contained therein are also often referred to as significant digits or significant
figures. In our example above, the first position (with D1* = 1) and the second position
(with D2* = 3) are target positions. All trailing positions are denoted non-target
positions; thus, the rightmost target position in the mantissa M* – the target position
with the highest X – is exclusively followed by non-target positions.
Considering A2–A5, the intuition to this point is that the reported value N is
managed upward until it meets the unobservable earnings target N*, the mantissa
M* of which results from rounding.4 Consequently, the effects on the mantissa M are
those that result from rounding upward.
(b) Distribution of Digits in Target Positions
With regard to target positions, the effect of target-driven earnings management on
the distribution of digits is ambiguous. At first glance, one may expect higher digits in
target positions for managed earnings than for unmanaged earnings. In our example
above, if the unmanaged value of the earnings metric were N+ = €115,867 – and
thus M+ = 1.15867 – managing earnings upward to exactly meet N* = €130,000
would increase the digit in position X = 2 from D2+ = 1 to D2 = D2* = 3. However,
managing earnings upward can also have the opposite effect on the mantissa in the
target positions. In our example, if N+ = €99,329 – and thus M+ = 9.9329 – managing
earnings upward to exactly meet N* = €130,000 would decrease the digits in the target
positions from D1+ = D2+ = 9 to D1 = D1* = 1 and D2 = D2* = 3. Consequently, the
effects of target-driven earnings management on the distribution of digits in the target
positions are ambiguous and therefore cannot be exploited.
4 For a discussion on the invariance of Benford’s Law to rounding, refer, for instance, to Tödter (2009).
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(c) Distribution of Digits in Non-Target Positions
Conversely, the distribution of digits in non-target positions of M can be investigated
unambiguously when target-driven earnings management occurs. Referring again to
our example above, the digits in non-target positions of the reported mantissa M for
both unmanaged earnings values N+ = 115,867 and N+ = 99,329 decrease to ‘0’
for all X  3 when target-driven earnings management occurs to exactly meet N*
(or to relatively low digits when N* is slightly exceeded). For unmanaged earnings
N+, a similar pattern would not be expected in the non-target positions, and M
would contain exactly the same digits in exactly the same sequence as M+. The ‘real’
value of the earnings metric N+, however, results from mere business activity, not
rounding. Consequently, the non-target positions of M should contain a relatively
higher frequency of the digit ‘0’ (or of relatively low digits) than they would when
earnings management does not occur, and thus, the mean of the distribution of
digits in non-target positions is negatively correlated with the degree of target-driven
earnings management.
(iii) Classification of Position X as a Target Position or a Non-Target Position
in Real Data
We acknowledge that it is not practically possible to distinguish between a target
position and a non-target position in realistic data, i.e., without exact knowledge of M*.
Numerous researchers have previously solved this issue by postulating an assumption
regarding the number of target positions in their particular datasets (Carslaw, 1988;
Thomas, 1989; Niskanen and Keloharju, 2000; van Caneghem, 2002, 2004; Kinnunen
and Koskela, 2003; Skousen et al., 2004; Guan et al., 2006; and Jorgensen et al., 2014,
as discussed in Section 2(ii)). Empirical evidence from these studies indicates that
firms set their earnings targets based either on only the first position or on the first
two positions of M*. Thus, one possible approach to the non-observability of the
number of target positions is – in line with previous research – to postulate an explicit
assumption concerning the characteristics of the data at hand. Nevertheless, cases of
target positions X > 2 can occur. For instance, a greater number of target positions may
be expected with greater total earnings target values (e.g., N* = 1.25 billion instead of
N* = 1.3 billion).
Our research design does not require an explicit assumption regarding
the exact number of target positions. Instead, we merely adopt the following
assumption:
A6: The propensity of observing a non-target position monotonically increases as X
increases.
The ambiguous effects of target-driven earnings management on the target posi-
tions that were described in Section 3(ii)(b) diminish as X increases because as a
direct consequence of A6, the propensity of observing a target position decreases
as X increases. Note that we do not assume that the number of target positions
is similar for all firms in a given dataset or that the number of target positions is
observable.
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(iv) Research Design
Summarizing the above, we derive our main conclusions:
C1: The mean of the distribution of digits in non-target positions is relatively lower for the
group in which the level of target-driven earnings management is relatively higher.
C2: When an assumption concerning the number of target positions does not exist for the
relevant data, C1 can be investigated by gradually extending the analysis to positions
with higher X.
When investigating C1, the non-observable characteristic of whether a position X
in the mantissa M of the reported value N is either a target position or a non-
target position must be taken into account. First, if the researcher has an econom-
ically founded assumption regarding the number of target positions in the relevant
dataset(s), the mean of the distribution of digits may be selectively investigated in the
corresponding non-target positions in reference to previous research. However, when
no such information is available, C2 can be employed.5
We note that C1 and C2 hold even if M*, λ* and the number of target positions
are different for each firm in the dataset. Moreover, none of these variables needs to
be available to the researcher. This feature of our research design is crucial because
it allows for the joint investigation of firms with different earnings targets. It also
allows for samples with mixtures of categories of earnings targets, i.e., one sub-sample
that focuses on previous-year values and another sub-sample that focuses on analyst
forecasts. Finally, our research design is technically applicable to any earnings metric
that would be subject to target-driven earnings management, such as net income
(Carslaw, 1988; Niskanen and Keloharju, 2000; Kinnunen and Koskela, 2003; Skousen
et al., 2004; and Guan et al., 2006 (quarterly net income)), earnings before taxes
(van Caneghem, 2002, 2004), earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued
operations (Carslaw, 1988; and Thomas, 1989), or earnings per share (Thomas, 1989;
Das and Zhang, 2003; and Jorgensen et al., 2014).
Two implicit assumptions remain. First, the distribution of the number of target
positions must be assumed to not differ between the groups of firms that are compared
with respect to their earnings management activity (when earnings management can
occur with both groups). This conjecture is similarly made by Carslaw (1988) and
others, who additionally make an assumption regarding the exact number of target
positions, which is not necessary here. Second, we assume that the distribution of
digits in unmanaged earnings would be equal across the groups of firms compared.
This conjecture evidently includes, but is not limited to, the respective assump-
tions made by the research stream related to Carslaw (1988) and Das and Zhang
(2003).
5 To keep the analysis manageable, an assumption regarding the highest position X that may be a target
position in the available dataset should be made, although such an assumption is not technically necessary.
According to prior research discussed in Section 3(iii), X  2 appears to be a reasonable assumption in this
regard; hence, X = 2 and X = 3 are the most likely values for the leftmost non-target position. Consequently,
limiting the analysis to X  4 should generally be sensible.
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We use a two-period Monte Carlo simulation approach. Four factors must be ac-
counted for in this simulation approach, namely (i) the distribution of unmanaged
earnings N+, (ii) the distribution of earnings targets N*, (iii) the number of target po-
sitions, and (iv) managers’ earnings management aggressiveness (similar to Degeorge
et al., 1999).
We derive the distribution of N from the AMADEUS database for very large, large
and medium-sized firms via Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). Based on net
income over 2009–2013 from all consolidated and unconsolidated statements reported
in euros (3,306,508 firm-years), we use kernel density (Epanechnikov kernel) to
estimate a continuous logarithmic distribution of N (model fit: R2adj = 95.79%). From
this, we generate N* by rounding (refer to A5) and N+ by building on the relative
change in earnings data in Table 1, Panel A of Burgstahler and Dichev (1997). We set
the number of target positions in N* to be an independent random variable per firm
that follows a discrete uniform distribution such that the number of target positions
can take integer values of ‘1’, ‘2’ or ‘3’.
For the treatment group only, we define earnings management aggressiveness ϵ
as the difference between N* and N+, scaled by N*, that the manager is willing to
bridge by means of target-driven earnings management. Finally, we set parameter υ
as a boundary for exceeding the earnings target value N* by means of target-driven
earnings management in the treatment group with υmin = 0% (mode) and υmax = 2%
in a triangular distribution. Figure 1 presents a detailed summary of the simulation
approach.
Figure 1
Graphical Summary of the Simulation Approach
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Table 1
Simulation Application
Difference in Means for Xth position(s) Treatment Group
Parameter ϵ βX=2 βX=2&3 βX=3&4 βX=2&3&4 Frequency of EM
0% 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000%
(0.029) (0.013) (0.006) (0.022) [0.000%]
1% −0.015 −0.016 −0.010 −0.011 0.402%
(−0.358) (−0.544) (−0.335) (−0.479) [0.283%]
2% −0.028 −0.028 −0.016 −0.020 0.787%
(−0.701) (−0.975) (−0.553) (−0.855) [0.405%]
3% −0.042 −0.039* −0.021 −0.028 1.195%
(−1.038) (−1.349) (−0.721) (−1.187) [0.497%]
4% −0.054* −0.049** −0.025 −0.035* 1.582%
(−1.336) (−1.703) (−0.864) (−1.475) [0.561%]
5% −0.066* −0.058** −0.029 −0.042** 1.976%
(−1.633) (−2.015) (−1.014) (−1.768) [0.631%]
6% −0.078** −0.069*** −0.035 −0.049** 2.385%
(−1.921) (−2.387) (−1.223) (−2.105) [0.686%]
7% −0.087** −0.078*** −0.041* −0.056*** 2.770%
(−2.127) (−2.702) (−1.428) (−2.392) [0.735%]
8% −0.097*** −0.087*** −0.046* −0.063*** 3.157%
(−2.377) (−3.028) (−1.583) (−2.662) [0.770%]
9% −0.104*** −0.095*** −0.050** −0.068*** 3.557%
(−2.558) (−3.312) (−1.751) (−2.903) [0.831%]
10% −0.113*** −0.101*** −0.053** −0.073*** 3.936%
(−2.781) (−3.519) (−1.829) (−3.096) [0.890%]
Notes:
The leftmost column shows different parameter settings ϵ for the simulation that present different levels
of earnings management aggressiveness for the treatment group firms. The number of target positions
is set randomly to be discretely uniformly distributed between 1 and 3. In the treatment group, earnings
management can exceed the earnings target in a triangular distribution with parameter υ between υ = 0%
(mode) and υ = 2%. For all parameters, independent treatment and control groups are generated with
10,000 firms each and simulations are conducted with 3,000 iterations. All reported coefficients are mean
values over these 3,000 iterations.
Coefficients βX are the difference in means between treatment and control group for the digits contained
in the Xth position(s) as indicated. In cases where βX is greater than zero, the mean of the digits in the Xth
position(s) is greater for the treatment group than for the control group and vice versa. t-Values of unpaired
one-sided t-tests (unequal variance) are given in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate (average) significance at
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The rightmost column shows, for the treatment group of firms only,
the percentage of firms that in fact engage in earnings management (Frequency of EM). Sample standard
deviations are given in brackets.
(b) Expected Patterns in Application
At the outset, we use the simulation approach to present expected patterns from
the research design. First, we simulate earnings target N* and reported earnings N
for 1,500,000 control group firms. We therein measure v as the observed difference
between the (unmanaged) reported earnings value N and the earnings target N*,
scaled by N*. Figure 2 shows the mean of the distribution of digits conditional on v.
Figure 2 shows a distinct pattern around the earnings target N* for all positions
X  2, i.e., for all potential non-target positions. Specifically, the mean of the
distribution of digits (thin black solid line) slowly increases above its mean of means
(thick grey solid line) until the earnings target N* is nearly met (v → 0−). The
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Figure 2
Panel A (X = 1, X = 2, X = 3, X = 4) Panel B (X = 2&3, X = 3&4, X = 2&3&4)
Mean of the Distribution of Digits in Unmanaged Earnings Conditional on v
mean of the distribution of digits declines sharply when N* is exactly met (v = 0),
only to slowly return to the mean of means again when N* is exceeded (v > 0). A
similar pattern is present with X = 2&3, X = 3&4 and X = 2&3&4. Conversely, we
observe no such pattern with X = 1, which is always a target position. Based on this
graphical analysis, if A4 holds, the mean of the distribution of digits in non-target
positions is systematically lower for managed earnings than for unmanaged earnings.
Second, to simulate real application of the research design, we generate pairs of one
treatment group and one control group and compare them directly. Table 1 presents
the results.6
6 Dichev et al. (2013) report that approximately 10% of earnings per share are typically managed when
target-driven earnings management occurs on its merits, which directly translates into 10% of net income if
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Figure 3
Graphical In-Depth Analysis with Regard to Table 1 (ϵ = 10%)
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Interpreting Table 1, coefficients βX indicate the difference in means between the
treatment and the control groups for the position(s) X. Note that we do not report a
column for X = 1 because X = 1 is always a target position and therefore not of interest
(coefficients βX=1 are non-significant for all ϵ). We do investigate the effect of varying
windows of analysis that encompass more than one position X, particularly X = 2&3,
X = 3&4 and X = 2&3&4.7
We observe that all βX are negative for ϵ > 0%, although not always significantly
so. Moreover, (i) the absolute value of the coefficients, (ii) the significance and
(iii) the (relative) frequency of firms in the treatment group that in fact engage in
target-driven earnings management increase with the level of earnings management
aggressiveness ϵ.
As a peculiarity, we point out that the difference in means for X = 3&4 is lower than
that for X = 2&3 in absolute terms for all ϵ > 0% and consequently that significance
is lower despite similar standard errors (not tabulated). This observation is explained
by the results shown in Figure 2, where the mean of the distribution of digits strongly
fluctuates around the mean of means for X = 4, with only one distinguishable spike
in a narrow range of small absolute values of v, i.e., around v = 0%. In contrast, for
X = 2, the mean of the distribution of digits fluctuates to a lower degree and, moreover,
shifts distinctively at v = 0%. Consequently, substituting X = 4 for X = 2 decreases the
significance of the results.
Third, as an exemplary graphical in-depth analysis of the distribution of digits,
Figure 3 shows the frequency of DX with digits ‘0’ to ‘9’ for both the treatment group
(white) and the control group (gray) for the case of Table 1, ϵ = 10%.
Consistent with our expectations, we report for all X that the difference in the
cumulative distribution of digits between the treatment group and the control group
(dash-dotted line) is positive for all DX and increases monotonically for smaller DX
while, after its unique global maximum, decreasing monotonically for greater DX.8
Hence, it holds for all X that the non-target positions of managed earnings contain
a relatively higher frequency of relatively low digits than the non-target positions of
unmanaged earnings (in agreement with C1 and C2).
(c) Simulation Diagnostics
Panel A (Panel B) of Table 2 reports the percentage of observations for which the null
hypotheses of a smaller (greater) or equal mean of the distribution of digits in the
control group relative to the treatment group is rejected at a 5% nominal significance
level. With 3,000 iterations, the two-sided 95% confidence interval for the rejection
rate ranges from 4.23% to 5.77%.
In Table 2, we report in both panels that rejection rates at ϵ = 0% are largely not
significantly different from the nominal significance level of 5%. Non-significance of
rejection rates is also observed in both panels at ϵ> 0% for X = 1. Hence, we conclude
that our tests are well-specified under the null hypothesis.
the number of shares is assumed to be constant. We thus allow for distinct values of ϵ between 1% and 10%
in 10 equally distanced steps.
7 We limit our analysis to the leftmost four positions in the mantissa (X = 1, 2, 3, 4) for computational
convenience; however, no technical limitation exists in this regard.
8 A technical exception is X = 2, where the global maximum is the corner solution at D2 = 0.
C© 2016 The Authors Journal of Business Finance & Accounting Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd
76 ULLMANN AND WATRIN
Table 2
Rejection Rates Conditional on Sample Size and ϵ
Rejection Rates (%)
ϵ X = 1 X = 2 X = 2&3 X = 3&4 X = 2&3&4
Panel A
250 firms
0% 5.33 5.83 5.70 4.73 5.10
2% 4.97 6.47 6.73 5.87 6.13
4% 5.30 7.40 7.47 5.43 7.17
6% 5.13 9.50 10.57 7.13 9.63
8% 5.37 10.17 12.10 8.43 10.67
10% 4.97 12.10 14.43 8.37 11.07
1,000 firms
0% 5.33 4.90 5.77 4.80 5.67
2% 4.87 7.97 9.73 7.40 8.63
4% 4.77 10.60 13.43 8.40 13.00
6% 4.73 15.03 19.53 10.33 16.63
8% 4.57 18.30 24.40 13.10 20.77
10% 5.07 22.60 30.13 15.47 24.83
5,000 firms per group
0% 4.90 5.13 4.80 4.93 4.73
2% 5.70 11.30 15.47 10.47 13.87
4% 4.60 24.43 32.20 14.47 27.90
6% 5.17 38.80 51.80 20.93 44.07
8% 5.27 50.97 68.70 28.17 58.77
10% 4.90 61.50 79.27 34.43 68.93
10,000 firms
0% 4.87 4.37 5.10 4.70 4.97
2% 5.33 17.27 25.97 14.17 22.67
4% 5.57 37.30 52.27 20.57 43.17
6% 5.17 61.63 76.37 34.83 67.73
8% 4.73 75.60 91.50 48.33 85.73
10% 5.03 86.83 96.53 56.50 92.90
Panel B
250 firms
0% 5.13 5.23 4.73 5.20 4.87
2% 5.03 4.13 3.50 3.73 3.87
4% 5.27 3.30 3.13 3.83 3.53
6% 4.60 2.60 1.97 3.50 1.87
8% 5.03 2.17 1.93 3.67 2.03
10% 4.73 1.77 1.17 2.43 1.43
1,000 firms
0% 4.97 4.70 4.77 5.10 4.93
2% 5.83 2.90 2.27 3.60 2.40
4% 5.27 1.70 1.53 2.67 1.67
6% 4.93 1.23 0.97 2.07 1.37
8% 4.47 0.80 0.47 1.50 0.57
10% 4.23 0.53 0.20 1.10 0.37
5,000 firms
0% 5.47 6.00 4.90 4.53 5.20
2% 4.63 1.40 0.87 1.97 0.93
(Continued)
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ϵ X = 1 X = 2 X = 2&3 X = 3&4 X = 2&3&4
Panel B
4% 4.97 0.50 0.27 1.53 0.47
6% 4.90 0.13 0.03 0.60 0.10
8% 4.20 0.03 0.00 0.17 0.00
10% 5.27 0.00 0.00 0.27 0.00
10,000 firms
0% 5.53 6.20 5.33 5.00 4.33
2% 4.87 1.20 0.53 1.57 0.90
4% 4.63 0.10 0.07 0.70 0.10
6% 4.50 0.03 0.03 0.23 0.00
8% 4.27 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00
10% 4.73 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00
Notes:
Panel A reports rejection rates (in %) for a one-sided, unpaired, unequal variance t-test with a nominal
significance level of 5% and the alternative hypothesis that the mean of the distribution of digits is lower
in the treatment group than in the control group. Panel B reports rejection rates (in %) for a one-sided,
unpaired, unequal variance t-test with a nominal significance level of 5% and the alternative hypothesis that
the mean of the distribution of digits is lower in the control group than in the treatment group. Data are
generated by simulations using the number of firms shown in both the treatment group and the control
group and different levels of earnings management aggressivenes ϵ in the treatment group. A total of 3,000
iterations are run per parameter setting. To facilitate interpretation, rejection rates that are significantly
lower than the nominal significance level appear in bold italic type, while rejection rates that are significantly
greater than the nominal significance level appear in bold type (at a 5% nominal significance level in a two-
sided test).
In Panel A, we observe that rejection rates increase above the nominal significance
level in both the sample size and ϵ for all X  2 as expected. Corresponding to our
previous findings from Table 1, we also observe that rejection rates are relatively low for
X = 3&4. Exactly mirroring Panel A, Panel B shows that rejection rates are significantly
lower than 5% for all ϵ > 0% and X  2 and that they decrease with sample size and ϵ.
‘Horse Race’ against Carslaw (1988)
We replicate the analysis of the research stream that follows Carslaw (1988) (Section
2(ii)). Using the exact same dataset as in Tables 1 and 2, we employ a chi-squared
goodness of fit test with the null hypothesis of Benford’s Law to generate Table 3
(corresponds to Table 1) and Table 4 (corresponds to Table 2, Panel A).9
First, we find that the patterns of significance in Table 1 and Table 3 are largely
identical, which indicates the validity of our research design. When considering
Table 4 individually, we report that rejection rates are not significantly different from
the nominal significance level for ϵ= 0% with X  2; thus, the unmanaged data do not
contradict Benford’s Law in the potential non-target positions (as already indicated in
Figure 3 (black whiskers)). In contrast, we note that rejection rates are significantly
above the nominal significance level for all ϵ  0 with the target position X = 1. We
9 By design, the chi-squared goodness of fit test does not allow replication of Table 2, Panel B.
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Table 3
Horse Race against Carslaw (1988): Table 1 replicated
Parameter Chi-Squared Test for Fit to Benford’s Law for Xth position(s)
ϵ χ2X=2 χ2X=2&3 χ2X=3&4 χ2X=2&3&4
0% 9.342 9.374 9.082 9.299
1% 10.171 10.388 9.265 10.047
2% 11.606 12.334 9.793 11.514
3% 13.395 14.658 10.350 13.256
4% 15.249* 16.906* 10.653 14.769*
5% 17.943** 20.030** 11.228 17.244**
6% 20.887** 24.743*** 12.515 20.886**
7% 24.201*** 29.364*** 13.703 24.497***
8% 27.711*** 34.431*** 14.732* 28.099***
9% 31.812*** 40.591*** 16.341* 32.878***
10% 36.038*** 44.953*** 16.914* 36.223***
Notes:
The leftmost column shows different parameter settings ϵ of the simulation that present different levels
of earnings management aggressiveness of the treatment group firms. The number of target positions is
set randomly to be discretely uniformly distributed between 1 and 3. In the treatment group, earnings
management can exceed the earnings target in a triangular distribution with parameter υ between υ = 0%
(mode) and υ = 2%. For all parameters, independent treatment and control groups are generated with
10,000 firms each and simulations are conducted with 3,000 iterations. All reported coefficients are mean
values over these 3,000 iterations.
Coefficients χ2X show the test value of a Chi2 Goodness of Fit Test to Benford’s Law in the treatment group
for the digits contained in the Xth position(s) as indicated. ***, ** and * indicate (average) significance at
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
also observe a number of non-significant rejection rates with X  2 for smaller ϵ > 0%
and for smaller sample sizes of 250 and 1,000 firms. Reconsidering Table 2, Panel A, in
comparison with Table 4 (markers + and −), we report that rejection rates in Table 4
are significantly lower for the majority of cases with X  2 and hence for the potential
non-target positions. More specifically, the rejection rates in Table 4 are significantly
larger only for greater sample sizes of 5,000 and 10,000 firms with X = 2, X = 2&3 and
X = 2&3&4. We also observe that the tests applied by Carslaw (1988) have relatively
higher rejection rates for X = 1 than does our research design, which corresponds to
expectations for the reasons discussed in Section 3(ii)(b).
Finally, to gain deeper insight into the effect of the sample size on rejection rates,
we perform an exemplary graphical in-depth analysis of Table 4 relative to Table 2,
Panel A. Specifically, Figures 4 and 5 show a more granular analysis of rejection rates
conditional on sample size, both for the method applied by Carslaw (1988) (thin black
dashed line) and for our research design (thin black solid line), including the one-
sided confidence interval at 5% level of significance (gray shaded area). We limit the
analysis to the non-target positions and to the case of ϵ = 10% (Figure 4), as in
Figure 3 above, and to the case of ϵ = 0% (Figure 5).
Figure 4 indicates that our research design has higher power in smaller samples.
More specifically, the rejection rates of the (false) Null are significantly higher for
X = 2 and X = 2&3 (X = 2&3&4) in samples smaller than approximately 3,000 (4,700)
firms. The two power functions also have exactly one intersection point for X = 3&4,
which occurs approximately at a sample size of 23,500 firms (not shown). We further
report that intersection points between the two power functions observed in Figure 4
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Figure 4
Graphical In-Depth Analysis with Regard to Table 4 (ϵ = 10%)
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Figure 5
Graphical In-Depth Analysis with Regard to Table 4 (ϵ = 0%)
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Table 4
Horse Race against Carslaw (1988): Table 2, Panel A, replicated
Rejection Rates [%]
ϵ X = 1 X = 2 X = 2&3 X = 3&4 X = 2&3&4
250 firms
0% 7.67 4.90 4.73 5.00 4.90
2% 8.43
+
4.93 5.63 5.43 5.87
4% 7.80 4.90 5.70 4.73 5.50
6% 8.90
++
6.03 - 6.30 - - 5.33 6.17 -
8% 9.43
++
6.33 - 7.33 - - 6.27 6.87 -
10% 9.47
++




5.17 5.27 5.07 5.37
2% 8.50
+++
5.07 - - - 5.40 - - - 5.03 - - 5.30 - - -
4% 10.50
+++
6.60 - - - 7.20 - - - 4.60 - - - 7.23 - - -
6% 13.37
+++
8.93 - - - 10.60 - - - 6.40 - - - 9.10 - - -
8% 16.20
+++
11.60 - - - 14.83 - - - 6.37 - - - 11.50 - - -
10% 21.37
+++




4.97 4.87 4.50 4.97
2% 11.50
+++
7.27 - - - 9.20 - - - 6.63 - - - 8.83 - - -
4% 23.63
+++
17.90 - - - 21.67 - - - 7.07 - - - 16.40 - - -
6% 39.70
+++






















13.53 - - - 15.60 - - - 7.00 - - - 12.97 - - -
4% 42.93
+++






















44.03 - - - 97.20
+++
Notes:
The table reports rejection rates (in %) for a Chi2 Goodness of Fit Test to Benford’s Law with a nominal
significance level of 5%. Data are generated by simulations using the number of firms shown in the
treatment group and different levels of earnings management aggressivenes ϵ. A total of 3,000 iterations
are run per parameter setting. To facilitate interpretation, rejection rates that are significantly lower than
the nominal significance level appear in bold italic type while rejection rates that are significantly greater
than the nominal significance level appear in bold type (at a 5% nominal significance level in a two-sided
test). Markers +++, ++ and + (- - -, - - and -) indicate that the rejection rate is significantly higher (lower)
than the comparable rejection rate in Table 2, Panel A, at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, of a
one-sided t-test of between sample differences in proportions with standard errors computed according to
Fleiss et al. (2003).
occur similarly for smaller ϵ but shift to the right as ϵ is decreased toward 0% (not
shown). Hence, the advantage of higher power in small samples is even amplified when
earnings management activity in the data is lower. Figure 5 then compares occurrences
of Type I errors in both methods (ϵ = 0%), and we observe that rejection rates of the
(true) Null are neither significantly different from the nominal significance level of
5% nor significantly different between tests.
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Overall, our research design reveals similar patterns to the methods applied by the
research stream around Carslaw (1988), providing evidence of its validity. Moreover,
we demonstrate that our research design offers relatively higher power in small sam-
ples and that this effect is amplified for small levels of earnings management activity –
without a corresponding increase in Type I error rates. This analysis supports the view
that our research design is adequate when earnings management research must rely
on a small subsample of firms (e.g., a certain industry), on a limited number of years
(e.g., new data after reform) or when the level of earnings management activity is low.
(ii) Archival Analysis
(a) Archival Approach
Archival accounting data are naturally associated with the limitation that they do not
allow for observation of the unmanaged value of the earnings metric N+ or often even
of the firm-level earnings target N*; only the reported value N is certainly observable.
Moreover, the degree of earnings management is unknown. Nevertheless, we apply our
research design to three realistic settings in which target-driven earnings management
has previously been demonstrated to exist. Our tests are independent of one another
and deliberately rely on a variety of earnings metrics, accounting settings and databases
to demonstrate that neither of these design choices drives the results.
(b) Positive vs. Negative Earnings per Share
As our first test, we replicate the analysis of Das and Zhang (2003). Their analysis
reveals that when positive earnings per share are reported by firms, digits in the
1/10th cent position have a higher than 50% propensity to be equal to or greater
than ‘5’. They find the opposite, i.e., that digits are mostly smaller than ‘5’, when
negative earnings per share are reported. Assuming a uniform distribution of digits
in the 1/10th cent position of unmanaged earnings, both of these findings indicate
upward rounding with a focus on the cent position. We note that Dechow and You
(2012) demonstrate that the process of setting an earnings target N* in earnings per
share corresponds to our assumptions, particularly A5.
We follow Das and Zhang (2003) in using data from Compustat for US firms in
the fundamentals quarterly file over the period 1989 to 1998 and collect these data
via WRDS. Consistent with their approach, we keep all observations with complete
data regarding the following variables: income before extraordinary items available
for common, extraordinary items and discontinued operations, net sales, operating
income before depreciation, net cash flow from operating activities and common
shares used to calculate basic earnings per share. We refrain from merging additional
I/B/E/S data, as do Das and Zhang (2003) to facilitate their robustness tests, leaving
us with a sample of 180,446 firm-quarter observations (relative to 103,994 firm-quarter
observations in Das and Zhang, 2003). Our number of observations ranges from
13,764 for year 1989 to 22,265 for year 1998. At the outset, we replicate Figure 1
(Figure 2) from Das and Zhang (2003) using net income per share and find virtually
the same distinct patterns (not shown). We then replicate the main results in Table 1
of Das and Zhang (2003) and show our findings in Table 5.
C© 2016 The Authors Journal of Business Finance & Accounting Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd
THE DISTRIBUTION OF DIGITS 83
Table 5
Frequency of Rounding in the Cent Position for Different Earnings Metrics: Das
and Zhang (2003), Table 1 replicated
Positive Negative Round
0  DX=1 < 5 5  DX=1 0  DX=1 < 5 5  DX=1 Yes No
Panel A: Net Income
S 54,726 62,924 33,032 30,215 95,956 84,941
Actual Proportion 46.5 53.5 52.2 47.8 53.0 47.0
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
Panel B: Earnings Before Extraordinary Items
S 54,924 62,808 32,770 29,956 95,578 84,880
Actual Proportion 46.7 53.3 52.2 47.8 53.0 47.0
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
Panel C: Sales
S 74,812 75,371 0 0 75,371 74,812
Actual Proportion 49.8 50.2 50.2 49.8
p-value 0.075 – 0.075
Panel D: Operating Income Before Depreciation
S 71,342 70,673 20,601 19,372 91,274 90,714
Actual Proportion 50.2 49.8 51.5 48.5 50.2 49.8
p-value 0.962 0.000 0.189
Panel E: Net Cash Flow from Operations
S 56,776 56,169 34,698 33,886 90,867 90,662
Actual Proportion 50.3 49.7 50.6 49.4 50.1 49.9
p-value 0.965 0.001 0.630
Notes:
The column ‘Positive’ (‘Negative’) hold distribution of digits analyses when the respective per share value
is greater (smaller) zero. Column ‘Round’ shows cases of upwards-rounding. DX=? denotes the digit in
position X as indicated, where X = 1 per definition describes 1/10th cent position in the per share value.
S indicates the number of firm-quarters included. The p-values shown derive from a one-sided t-test of
between sample differences in proportions with standard errors computed according to Fleiss et al. (2003).
All values are per share values and computed according to Das and Zhang (2003). Specifically items are
computed as follows. Panel A: net income per share = (income before extraordinary items available for
common + extraordinary items and discontinued operations)/common shares used to calculate basic
earnings per share; Panel B: earnings before extraordinary items per share = income before extraordinary
items available for common/common shares used to calculate basic earnings per share; Panel C: sales per
share = net sales/common shares used to calculate basic earnings per share; Panel D: operating income
before depreciation per share = operating income before depreciation/common shares used to calculate
basic earnings per share; Panel E: net cash flow from operations per share = net cash flow from operating
activities/common shares used to calculate basic earnings per share.
Comparing Table 5 with the corresponding Table 1 in Das and Zhang (2003),
we report nearly equivalent findings. First, we confirm that the propensity of digits
DX=1  5 is higher than expected under the Null for positive reported values with
net income per share (Panel A) and earnings before extraordinary items per share
(Panel B) but not with operating income before depreciation per share (Panel D) and
net cash flow from operations per share (Panel E). The differences in sales per share
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are marginally significant (Panel C). Second, we observe the exact opposite effects
when negative values are reported in Panel A and Panel B. We note that, contrary to
Das and Zhang (2003), we also find significantly more digits DX=1 < 5 than expected
under the Null in Panels D and E. Third, overall, we report significantly more firms
rounding upward than firms rounding downward in Panels A and B, consistent with
the prior of target-driven earnings management that builds on upward rounding in
the cent position. We do not find any significant differences in terms of the propensity
of rounding upward in Panels D and E.
Hence, target-driven earnings management of the specific pattern described by
Das and Zhang (2003) is present in the data for the two earnings metrics of net
income per share and earnings before extraordinary items per share. Consequently,
we should observe a relatively high frequency of low digits in the positions X  2
for positive values in these earnings metrics and vice versa for negative values. We
test this proposition by applying our research design and directly comparing these
two groups of observations. Note that the specific setting of Das and Zhang (2003)
implicitly identifies the 1/10th cent position as the rightmost target position (see our
discussion in Section 3(iii) and C2 above). This holds for both positive values and
negative values, and hence, in light of Figure 2, we should expect strongest effects in
the correspondingly established leftmost non-target position, i.e., in the 1/100th cent
position (X = 2). Our results are reported in Table 6.10
Table 6
Comparison of Positive per Share Values and Negative per Share Values for
Different Earnings Metrics as Shown in Table 5
βX=2 βX=2&3 βX=3&4 βX=2&3&4
Panel A: Net Income −0.046*** −0.016 0.005 −0.012
(−3.198) (−1.617) (0.488) (−1.457)
Panel B: Earnings Before Extraordinary Items −0.042*** −0.016 −0.000 −0.014*
(−2.960) (−1.591) (−0.022) (−1.736)
Panel D: Operating Income Before Depreciation 0.013 0.009 0.011 0.011
(0.775) (0.791) (0.956) (1.228)
Panel E: Net Cash Flow from Operations −0.005 −0.011 −0.019* −0.014*
(−0.339) (−1.141) (−1.942) (−1.781)
Notes:
All values are per share values and computed according to Das and Zhang (2003). Specifically items are
computed as follows. Panel A: net income per share = (income before extraordinary items available for
common + extraordinary items and discontinued operations)/common shares used to calculate basic
earnings per share; B: earnings before extraordinary items per share = income before extraordinary items
available for common/common shares used to calculate basic earnings per share; Panel D: operating
income before depreciation per share = operating income before depreciation/common shares used to
calculate basic earnings per share; Panel E: net cash flow from operations per share = net cash flow from
operating activities/common shares used to calculate basic earnings per share. Coefficients βX are the
difference in means between positive and negative per share values in the Xth position(s) as indicated.
X = 1 per definition describes 1/10th cent position in the per share value. In cases where βX is greater
than zero, mean of the digits in the Xth position(s) is greater for the negative per share values than for the
negative per share values and vice versa. t-Values of two-sided unpaired t-tests (unequal variance) for the
significance of βX are given in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicates (average) significance at the 1%, 5% and
10% levels, respectively.
10 Note that sales per share (Panel C) cannot be investigated here, as in Das and Zhang (2003), because it
is always equal to or greater than zero.
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We observe the same patterns in Table 6, Panel A and Panel B as in Table 1, although
the patterns in Table 6 are less pronounced for X > 2. Corresponding to our prior,
the coefficients βX are mostly negative, but often insignificant. Specifically, we find
coefficients significantly smaller than zero in both panels for X = 2 and marginally
so in Panel B for X = 2&3&4, which is overall consistent with our observations from
Table 5. In Panel E, we observe marginally significantly negative coefficients for X =
3&4 and X = 2&3&4, which are not supported by the results in Table 5.
In conclusion, the analysis based on our research design supports the conjecture
of target-driven earnings management with a focus on the 1/10th cent position in
earnings per share, and the comparison to the corresponding results of Das and Zhang
(2003) yields additional indications of its validity.
(c) Types of Annual Statements
As our second test, we distinguish types of annual statements on the firm level
based on the conjecture that each type provides information to a specific stakeholder
group. Whereas financial statements provide information to the capital markets, tax
statements provide information specifically to the tax authorities. Consequently, a
common proposition is that incentives to manage earnings upward (downward) are
more pronounced in the former (latter) (Hanlon and Heitzmann, 2010).
From a technical research perspective, tax statements are not publicly available.
However, in the European Union (EU) accounting environment, firms publish
both consolidated and unconsolidated financial statements, with the unconsolidated
financial statements being closely related to a firm’s tax statement. Watrin et al. (2014)
correspondingly adapt the above-mentioned proposition to state that incentives to
manage earnings upward are more (less) pronounced in consolidated (unconsol-
idated) financial statements. Additionally investigating the signed values of discre-
tionary accruals as well as levels of book-tax conformity, Watrin et al. (2014) find that
a higher degree of book-tax conformity is associated with more downward earnings
management and less upward earnings management in the consolidated financial
statement, thereby indicating that tax incentives have a considerable effect on the
consolidated financial statement (through the unconsolidated financial statement).
Consequently, target-driven earnings management in the consolidated statement is
expected to decrease in the level of book-tax conformity.
Our first analysis investigates the proposition that target-driven earnings manage-
ment is more pronounced in the consolidated statement than in the unconsolidated
statement. We use the above-mentioned AMADEUS data on EU firms (Section 4(i)(a))
and include all firm-years of public firms for which both consolidated financial
statements and unconsolidated financial statements are available (8,466 pairs of
financial statements). In line with prior research, we expect target-driven earnings
management with the earnings metrics (i) net income (Carslaw, 1988; Niskanen and
Keloharju, 2000; Kinnunen and Koskela, 2003; Skousen et al., 2004; and Guan et al.,
2006) and (ii) earnings before taxes (van Caneghem, 2002, 2004). We also investigate
(iii) earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT), as it is a common indicator of firm
operating performance. When analysing a specific earnings metric, we exclude all
observations for which the earnings metric is negative or does not have a minimum
accuracy of four positions in the mantissa M. The results are reported in Panel A of
Table 7.
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We observe the same patterns in Panel A of Table 7 as are reported in Table 1.
Specifically, the analysis of net income yields significant negative differences in means
for X = 2, X = 3&4 and X = 2&3&4. Similar patterns, albeit less significant, are
found for both earnings before taxes and earnings before interest and taxes. These
results speak to the hypothesis that there is a higher degree of target-driven earnings
management in the consolidated financial statements relative to the unconsolidated
financial statements.
As a somewhat naı̈ve reverse robustness test to this end, we repeat the analysis
using three metrics for which target-driven earnings management would not be
economically expected or would only be expected to a lesser degree, i.e., (iv) total
revenue, (v) total cash flow and (vi) long-term liabilities. The results are reported in
Panel B of Table 7. We find that the coefficients βX are not significant for total revenue
and long-term liabilities. Contrary to our prior, significant results are reported for total
cash flow. Coherently, recent research demonstrates that firms do engage in cash flow
management, specifically when analysts provide cash flow forecasts (e.g., McInnis and
Collins, 2011; and Ayers et al., 2013).
We then conduct a second analysis to investigate the effect of book-tax confor-
mity on target-driven earnings management in the consolidated financial statement.
Following Watrin et al. (2014), we use the AMADEUS data from above and add both
non-euro reported statements from AMADEUS and all available data from Compustat
(Global) via WRDS for the 27 EU member states. Our sample now contains 31,844
consolidated financial statements over the period 2009 to 2013. We then separate
Table 7
Comparison of Consolidated Financial Statements and Unconsolidated Financial
Statements for Different Earnings Metrics
βX=2 βX=2&3 βX=3&4 βX=2&3&4 S
Panel A: Target-Driven Earnings Management is Expected
Net Income −0.148*** −0.045 −0.109*** −0.122*** 5,934
(−2.619) (−1.139) (−2.668) (−3.683)
Earnings Before Taxes 0.029 0.032 −0.103** −0.059* 6,040
(0.527) (0.809) (−2.537) (−1.791)
Earnings Before Interest and Taxes −0.050 −0.024 −0.083* −0.072** 6,232
(−0.840) (−0.580) (−1.948) (−2.079)
Panel B: Target-Driven Earnings Management is not Expected
Total Revenue 0.041 −0.016 0.025 0.030 8,394
(0.915) (−0.499) (0.768) (1.153)
Total Cash Flow −0.031 0.008 −0.084** −0.066** 6,576
(−0.564) (0.207) (−2.152) (−2.087)
Long-Term Liabilities 0.018 0.044 −0.004 0.003 8,336
(0.389) (1.376) (−0.126) (0.119)
Notes:
Coefficients βX are the difference in means between the consolidated financial statements and the
unconsolidated financial statements in the Xth position(s) as indicated. In cases where βX is greater than
zero, mean of the digits in the Xth position(s) is greater for the consolidated financial statements than
for the unconsolidated financial statements and vice versa. t-Values of two-sided unpaired t-tests (unequal
variance) for the significance of βX are given in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicates (average) significance
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. S indicates the number of firm-years included.
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this sample into two sub-samples based on the Watrin et al. (2014) ranking of book-
tax conformity and their nominal identification of accounting systems. Specifically,
relying on Table 4 of Watrin et al. (2014), we label all countries above the median
rank of book-tax conformity and with nominal identification ‘one-book’ or ‘one/two-
book’ as high book-tax conformity and all countries below the median rank of book-tax
conformity and with nominal identification as ‘two-book’, ‘two/three-book’ or ‘three-
book’ as low book-tax conformity. Corresponding to Watrin et al. (2014), we then
hypothesize that target-driven earnings management in the consolidated financial
statement is relatively more pronounced for firms from a country of low book-tax
conformity. The results are reported in Table 8.
The results presented in Panel A of Table 8 indicate that target-driven earnings
management in consolidated financial statements is indeed systematically more
pronounced for firms in countries of low book-tax conformity. Comparing Panel A
in Table 8 and Panel A in Table 7, we find structurally similar results in both, but
the results on net income are weaker in Table 8. We argue that, even in countries
with low book-tax conformity, book-tax conformity is still strongest with net income
relative to earnings before taxes and earnings before interest and taxes. Consequently,
differences in target-driven earnings management between low book-tax conformity
countries and high book-tax conformity countries would be relatively weakest in net
income. Finally, considering Panel B of Table 8, which contains the metrics for which
Table 8
Comparison of Consolidated Financial Statements for Firms from low Book-Tax
Conformity Countries and from High Book-Tax Conformity Countries for
Different Earnings Metrics
βX=2 βX=2&3 βX=3&4 βX=2&3&4 S
Panel A: Target-Driven Earnings Management is Expected
Net Income 0.015 0.054 −0.117** −0.073* 8,701
(0.214) (1.080) (−2.254) (−1.733)
Earnings Before Taxes −0.182*** −0.079 −0.176*** −0.178*** 9,123
(−2.626) (−1.612) (−3.482) (−4.356)
Earnings Before Interest and Taxes −0.136** −0.126*** −0.247*** −0.210*** 9,146
(−1.990) (−2.633) (−4.985) (−5.232)
Panel B: Target-Driven Earnings Management is not Expected
Total Revenue −0.035 0.001 0.044 0.018 15,399
(−0.663) (0.019) (1.180) (0.584)
Total Cash Flow 0.078 0.025 −0.037 0.002 8,194
(0.980) (0.451) (−0.629) (0.035)
Long-Term Liabilities −0.051 −0.002 −0.035 −0.040 14,344
(−0.940) (−0.058) (−0.877) (−1.255)
Notes:
Coefficients βX are the difference in means between the consolidated financial statements for the low book-
tax conformity country firms and the high book-tax conformity country firms in the Xth position(s) as
indicated. In cases where βX is greater than zero, mean of the digits in the Xth position(s) is greater for the
low book-tax conformity country firms than for the high book-tax conformity country firms and vice versa.
t-Values of two-sided unpaired t-tests (unequal variance) for the significance of βX are given in parentheses.
***, ** and * indicates (average) significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. S indicates the
number of firm-years included.
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target-driven earnings management is not expected, we find no significant results at
all, supporting the conjecture that there are no between-country differences in the
distribution of digits per se.
In conclusion, our results support the findings of Watrin et al. (2014) that target-
driven earnings management is conditional on both the type of annual statement and
the accounting environment.
(d) Globally Smoothed Kernel Density
As our third test, we use the novel identification strategy proposed by Lahr (2014),
who estimates a kernel density distribution that is globally indistinguishable from the
underlying empirical distribution of the metric and which then serves as a reference
distribution for local deviations. The key for optimal smoothing (based on a given
kernel function) lies in the estimation of bin width by means of bootstrap simulations
(bootstrap KDE). Lahr (2014) demonstrates that his approach yields structurally
equivalent, but generally more conservative, results than the established analysis by
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997).
Replicating his setting, we use Compustat for US firms in the fundamentals annual
file via WRDS for the years 1976 to 2010. We rely, for identification, on standardized
changes in net income as applied by Lahr (2014), but we round the previous year
value earnings target to the first two positions of the mantissa M, corresponding to A5,
and hence we compute (NetIncomet − round(NetIncomet−1))/MarketValuet−2. Net
income in t and market value in t−2 are as reported. We further follow Lahr (2014) in
excluding firms with NAICS in ranges 4400–5000 and 6000–6500 as well as firm-year
observations with standardized changes in net income smaller than −1, greater than
+1 and exactly 0. We drop all observations with negative NetIncomet and require a
minimum accuracy of four positions in the mantissa. All observations in bootstrap KDE
bins of (NetIncomet − round(NetIncomet−1))/MarketValuet−2 above the earnings
target with significant divergence from the reference distribution at a 10% significance
level are then pooled and compared in their NetIncomet to observations in the
mirrored bins just below the threshold (with a maximum of six bins as set by Lahr,
2014). Table 9 shows the results.
We observe the same patterns in Table 9 as observed in Table 1 for all three kernel
functions and for different nominal significance levels α applied with the bootstrap
KDE. Corresponding to expectations, the coefficients are non-significant for X = 2,
which is the rightmost target position in this setting. We observe relatively high t-
values relative to previous analyses as a direct result of the small bin width generated by
the bootstrap KDE, which leads to observations relatively close to the earnings target.
The results are unchanged when (i) using an extended range of 12, 18 or 24 bins
around the earnings target, (ii) comparing all bins with significantly higher observed
frequency to bins with significantly lower observed frequency relative to the reference
distribution, and (iii) rounding down the previous year net income earnings target.
In conclusion, we find that our research design yields results structurally compa-
rable to those derived by the novel method of Lahr (2014). More generally, the tests
conducted also provide evidence that our research design is applicable in earnings
discontinuity settings, which also sets it in relation to the important research stream
surrounding Burgstahler and Dichev (1997).
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Table 9
Globally Smoothed Kernel Density as Reference Distribution
A βX=2 βX=2&3 βX=3&4 βX=2&3&4 S BinWidth
Epanechnikov Kernel (MaxDiff = 0.0001)
1% −0.060 −0.299*** −0.343*** −0.249*** 19,445 0.0062
(−1.414) (−9.883) (−11.466) (−10.122)
2.5% −0.061 −0.332*** −0.385*** −0.277*** 16,189 0.0051
(−1.307) (−10.075) (−11.825) (−10.354)
5% −0.102 −0.683*** −0.741*** −0.528*** 7,229 0.0046
(−1.499) (−14.226) (−15.577) (−13.497)
10% − − − − − 0.0035
Uniform Kernel (MaxDiff = 0.0001)
1% −0.054 −0.345*** −0.406*** −0.289*** 14,445 0.0045
(−1.094) (−9.940) (−11.835) (−10.238)
2.5% −0.069 −0.377*** −0.443*** −0.318*** 12,667 0.0040
(−1.327) (−10.192) (−12.120) (−10.608)
5% −0.037 −0.505*** −0.582*** −0.400*** 10,532 0.0033
(−0.637) (−12.387) (−14.434) (−12.081)
10% −0.092 −1.093*** −1.217*** −0.842*** 4,329 0.0027
(−1.050) (−17.743) (−19.969) (−16.723)
Gaussian Kernel (MaxDiff = 0.0001)
1% −0.046 −0.557*** −0.660*** −0.455*** 8,512 0.0026
(−0.730) (−12.348) (−14.798) (−12.429)
2.5% −0.151 −1.320*** −1.414*** −0.993*** 3,628 0.0023
(−1.579) (−19.685) (−21.227) (−18.055)
5% −0.119 −1.426*** −1.550*** −1.073*** 3,276 0.0021
(−1.182) (−20.159) (−22.125) (−18.516)
10% −0.102 −1.752*** −1.930*** −1.321*** 2,523 0.0016
(−0.893) (−21.685) (−24.224) (−19.933)
Notes:
Coefficients βX are the difference in means between firms in bins above the threshold with significant
local divergence from the global reference distribution and firms in the exact same bins mirrored below
the threshold in the Xth position(s) as indicated. In cases where βX is greater than zero, mean of the
digits in the Xth position(s) is greater for bins above the threshold than for bins below the threshold and
vice versa. t-Values of two-sided unpaired t-tests (unequal variance) for the significance of βX are given in
parentheses. ***, ** and * indicates (average) significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. α
indicates the one-sided nominal significance level for the creation of the bootstrap KDE, and S indicates the
number of firm-years included. Cases without significant bins are indicated as ‘–’. BinWidth reports the bin
width as it results from the bootstrap KDE as presented by Lahr (2014), and MaxDiff reports the respective
point of maximum difference between the kernel distribution estimate and the underlying empirical
distribution.
(iii) Robustness and Limitations
Any analysis of the distribution of digits follows a fundamentally different rationale
from that for the analyses most typically applied in accounting research. Consequently,
our research design is occasionally not immediately intuitive. Nonetheless, methods
investigating the distribution of digits are valuable to the research community and
have been demonstrated to be applicable in the earnings management context. Based
on these considerations, we include a rather extensive discussion below.
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First, the distribution of digits prevailing in the raw AMADEUS data used for our
simulation analysis in Section 4(i) may already be affected by earnings management.
Recall that converting the discretely distributed raw data to a continuous distribution
based on the kernel density estimation should sufficiently control for these effects
because we ultimately rely on AMADEUS only for the magnitude of the earnings
metric, whereas the resulting numerical structure is a direct result of simulated random
number generation. Moreover, we note that our research design can be applied
even if the control group firms also engage in target-driven earnings management
because merely relative differences in the degree of target-beating activity are exposed.
Lastly, because the value of unmanaged earnings in our simulations is generated
using an identical mechanism for both the control group and the treatment group,
any differences between groups must be attributed to the treatment of target-driven
earnings management.
Second, for the application of our research design, identifying the earnings
metric on which managers actually focus with respect to their earnings management
activity and measuring its exact reported value are vital. Obtaining this value may
be particularly problematic in samples that include different types of firms or firms
from different jurisdictions (e.g., earnings targets might be based on local GAAP,
whereas reported earnings are in IFRS or US GAAP). Selecting the correct earnings
metric seems to be an obvious requirement. However, we emphasize this requirement
nonetheless because even finding a reasonable proxy for the correct earnings metric –
which is often sufficient in positive accounting research – would not suffice for inves-
tigating the distribution of digits because any investigation in this regard relies on the
exact mantissa M. Similarly, researchers must consider the accuracy of the distribution
of digits in databases and when performing currency conversions. Positions within
the mantissa of the reported value N that are affected by rounding or approximate
currency conversion may not be analysed using our research design.
Third, firm size may theoretically influence the distribution of digits in very specific
circumstances.11 However, the effect of firm size on target positions decreases as X
increases, and thus, such effects primarily affect the target positions. As we discuss
above, target positions should, in any case, be treated with caution when target-driven
earnings management is analysed. Nonetheless, researchers may need to control for
differences in firm size in certain settings. Controlling for such differences in the
context of a distribution of digits analysis can be achieved by drawing random sub-
samples with firms of similar size and rerunning the analysis.
Finally, managers may not actually face an earnings threshold N* that is rounded
to a certain value. Instead, managers may receive private benefits per unit of managed
earnings (e.g., a bonus based on a given percentage of the reported net income).
Straightforwardly, our research design would not work under such circumstances
because it investigates only earnings management to meet a rounded earnings target.
Managers may also face an earnings target that is based on some form of target growth
rate. In this case, the earnings metric to be investigated must be the growth rate rather
11 For instance, assume that the reported earnings in one group are 10% higher than those of firms in
another group, independent of whether target-driven earnings management occurs. Whereas reported
incomes of 1.20 million and 1.32 million have identical values of λ, D2 and D3 are greater to account for
the greater total value. Because the researcher cannot observe whether positions X = 2 and X = 3 are target
positions, size might affect the results.
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than the underlying annual statement item.12 Similar to our investigation of earnings
per share from Section 4(ii)(b), a natural rightmost target position in these settings
might be the second position or third position after the decimal. Our research design
is not limited to monetary values.
5. APPLICATION IN REGRESSION ANALYSIS
We derive that the mean of the distribution of digits in the non-target positions is
negatively correlated with the degree of target-driven earnings management (refer to
C1). Naturally, this theoretical result can also be straightforwardly employed to proxy
for target-driven earnings management in regression analysis. To do so, researchers
must capture the mean of the distribution of digits in any position(s) X that is deemed
a non-target position(s). Such a variable could be created on both the firm level and
the group level.
6. CONCLUSIONS
We present a novel empirical strategy to detect differences in target-driven earnings
management activity between two or more groups of firms. Specifically, we find that
the mean of the distribution of digits in non-target positions is systematically lower for
managed earnings than for unmanaged earnings and provide extensive tests for the
utilization of this finding. It can also be extended to applications in standard regres-
sion analysis, which are arguably the most prevalent in positive accounting research.
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